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“Code is law.”1 
This bold proclamation, championed by the Bitcoin community, 
is meant to be a summation of the “new world order”2 ushered in by 
 
 *  © 2019 Henry S. Zaytoun. 
 1. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 5 (2d ed. 2006) (rewording the 
phrasing of other cyberspace advocates). 
 2. See, e.g., Nikola Grozdanovic, Cryptocurrencies: A New Financial World Order, 
WORLD FIN. (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/cryptocurrencies-a-
new-financial-world-order [https://perma.cc/93DL-7MRU]; Brian Worley, Into the Ether, 
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innovations in peer-to-peer software protocols3 commonly known as 
blockchain technology. These protocols make it possible for 
individuals to safely and securely complete transactions in digital 
information of some value, also known as “cryptocurrency,”4 without 
the need for either a central authority5 to act as a third party or 
government-enforced rule of law.6 But what happens when code fails 
to protect the basic rights that our existing laws have always sought to 
protect? 
Bitcoin—a cryptocurrency that is one form of blockchain 
information—continues to dominate the daily headlines, primarily 
due to its wild fluctuations in market price.7 The all-time-high market 
price reached in 2017 correlates, unsurprisingly, with the record 
number of transactions8 and wallet users9 achieved. But the meteoric 
rise in price occurred without much public discussion of blockchain’s 
technological innovation outside of a relatively small group of 
 
COINREPORT (July 27, 2016), https://coinreport.net/into-the-ether-ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/
GB9X-K53K]. 
 3. Protocols, in this sense, are the rules written into the code that govern how the 
software may be used. See PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: 
CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND ECONOMICS 18 (2015). 
 4. The use of this term merely reflects common usage and the common 
understanding of the items of value exchanged in basic blockchain transactions. It is not to 
suggest that these items of value are currency. While some maintain and advocate this 
position, whether or not the items are currency is inconsequential to the inquiry here. In 
addition, while the creator of blockchain protocols, Satoshi Nakamoto, and others argued 
that these items must have value, I do not argue that point here. Rather, this Comment 
merely assumes a basic premise that if a market exists for some item, it therefore has some 
value. 
 5. See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC 
CASH SYSTEM 4, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4LH-SC68]. 
 6. See John V. Orth, The Rule of Law, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 175, 179 (noting the 
“generic” definition of the term to mean “a legal system that prevents arbitrariness, 
guarantees equal treatment, and – in many usages – enforces contracts and protects 
property”). One of the earliest advocates of Bitcoin, Erik Voorhees, now runs a website 
devoted to promoting Bitcoin and explaining the underlying blockchain technology. The 
website’s tagline is a quotation that embodies the above described sentiment: “Give me 
control of a nation’s money, and I care not who makes its laws.” MONEY & ST., 
http://moneyandstate.com [https://perma.cc/8YPZ-FY6Q]. 
 7. E.g., Samuel Gibbs, Bitcoin Drops $2,000 in Value as South Korea Announces 
Planned Trading Ban, GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/jan/11/bitcoin-drops-value-south-korea-trading-ban-cryptocurrencies-tax-
gambling [https://perma.cc/C2DE-X8SL (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 8. Confirmed Transactions Per Day, BLOCKCHAIN (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://blockchain.info/charts/n-transactions?timespan=1year [https://perma.cc/RME5-L6GW].  
 9. Blockchain Wallet Users, BLOCKCHAIN (Aug. 27, 2018), https://blockchain.info/
charts/my-wallet-n-users?timespan=all [https://perma.cc/Z82M-XHQU]. 
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advocates and academics.10 This may be partly by design—in the early 
efforts to brand Bitcoin in a palatable, easy-to-understand way, 
advocates referred to Bitcoin as “digital gold,”11 a cryptocurrency,12 
and, most simply, as a new form of money.13 Yet it is the blockchain 
code, rather than Bitcoin in particular, that is garnering the largest 
investments for further development from companies like Google, 
Citibank, and Goldman Sachs.14 In addition, companies like IBM are 
actively developing blockchain technology for use by a variety of 
business.15 
These investments and developments appear to be the result of 
varied potential uses of the blockchain protocol beyond mere 
“storage and transfer” of Bitcoin as currency.16 The list of alternate 
applications is long—digital asset, smart property, micropayments, 
crowdfunding, smart contracts, and storage of metadata—but, as of 
this writing, each remains in the relatively early stages of 
development.17 Some argue that these applications are operable using 
 
 10. See Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain 
Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 571–72 (2015). 
 11. See Jeff Cox, Novogratz: Bitcoin is ‘Digital Gold’ and Will End the Year at $10,000, 
CNBC (Nov. 21, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/21/novogratz-Bitcoin-is-
digital-gold-and-will-end-the-year-at-10000.html [https://perma.cc/EGD6-GKYA]. 
 12. NAKAMOTO, supra note 5. 
 13. Erik Voorhees, The Role of Bitcoin as Money, MONEY & ST. (May 23, 2013), 
http://moneyandstate.com/role-Bitcoin-money/ [https://perma.cc/JN2E-D9U4] (“Forget the 
tech. Forget the mining. Forget the cryptography and the peer to peer networks and the 
open source code. .	.	. The core of the Bitcoin experiment is not about tech at all, it’s about 
money.”). This might explain, in part, why the main focus of Bitcoin reporting centers on 
the daily fluctuations in its price.  
 14. Blockchain Investment Trends in Review, CBINSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.com/
research/report/blockchain-trends-opportunities/ [https://perma.cc/CY6R-XBG6]. “Since 
2012, corporates have participated in 140+ equity investments totaling nearly $1.2 
[billion],” with most of that total coming in the last three years. Id. At the same time, 
however, some banks, like Goldman Sachs, are investing in Bitcoin futures. Dakin 
Campbell & Laura J. Keller, Goldman Sachs Plans to Clear Bitcoin Futures When They 
Go Live, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2017, 4:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-12-07/goldman-sachs-is-said-to-clear-bitcoin-futures-when-they-go-live 
[https://perma.cc/7G7Q-MZTV (dark archive)]. 








(identifying thirty-three use cases to date). 
 16. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 183. 
 17. See generally id. at 183–207 (detailing the various types of digital assets).  
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current blockchain protocol with few, if any, changes required.18 But 
because of the undeveloped nature of these use cases, most scholarly 
articles are devoted to Bitcoin’s use and regulatory efforts directed at 
treating Bitcoin as money.19 Still others explore the idea of Bitcoin as 
a security20 or a commodity.21 At the same time, however, both 
scholarly and development-focused efforts tend to sidestep one of the 
major issues plaguing blockchain to date: theft. 
While the impact of cryptocurrency theft is presently limited to 
niche markets and a select group of investors, it will become a more 
widespread problem as the underlying blockchain technology is 
implemented across industries. This threat forecasts the potential for 
huge economic loss. Perhaps more importantly, it also undermines a 
universal principle of any organized society, one that most intuitively 
accept as true22: “[i]t is a crime to steal what belongs to someone 
else.”23 And rule of law values are implicit in this principle—that 
“rule by law” is an important aspect of effective government and a 
bulwark against tyranny.24  
These principles, however, are merely a starting point—both 
raise important questions concerning what actions a society considers 
theft and the things that may be objects of theft.25 The concepts are 
interrelated; each tends to track closely both societal and economic 
developments.26 As Bitcoin continues to dominate public 
conversation and remains the most widely used cryptocurrency27 to 
date, it provides the best conduit to explore the application of these 
concepts to blockchain and blockchain-based assets. 
It is estimated that, since its inception, over 980,000 Bitcoins 
have been lost through unauthorized takings, mostly individual 
 
 18. Id. at 183. 
 19. E.g., Ed Howden, Comment, The Crypto-Currency Conundrum: Regulating an 
Uncertain Future, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 741, 761–63 (2015). 
 20. E.g., Christopher Burks, Recent Development, Bitcoin: Breaking Bad or Breaking 
Barriers, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 244, 246 (2017). 
 21. E.g., Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for 
Regulating Cryptocurrency Payment Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 507–11 
(2015). 
 22. See STUART P. GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE 1 (2012) (“[I]t is 
hard to imagine any organized society without [prohibitions on theft].”). 
 23. LAURENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
108 (1993). 
 24. Orth, supra note 6, at 181. 
 25. Michael E. Tigar, The Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV. 
1443, 1443–44 (1984). 
 26. Id. at 1444. 
 27. For discussion of cryptocurrency, see infra Part II. 
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accounts located on major Bitcoin exchanges.28 This loss represents 
an amount over $3.5 billion,29 and most of these losses have occurred 
within the last four years.30 When such losses occur, the media often 
reports them in terms of theft.31 This reaction implies a general 
understanding, without analysis, that such a taking is legally theft—
that is, the taking of a thing (Bitcoin) belonging to someone else that 
society recognizes as an action deserving punishment. This framing 
generally mirrors the response by victims of Bitcoin theft. 
While some individuals simply accept this risk of loss as an 
inevitable result of participating in the Bitcoin market,32 a growing 
number are complaining to regulatory agencies about the problem.33 
This uptick in complaints is due in part to the rapid increase in losses 
attributed to Bitcoin theft, and the fact that once a Bitcoin is stolen, it 
 
 28. Jim Finkle & Jeremy Wagstaff, Hackers Steal $64 Million from Cryptocurrency 
Firm NiceHash, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2017, 10:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
cyber-nicehash/hackers-steal-64-million-from-cryptocurrency-firm-nicehash-idUSKBN1E10AQ 
[https://perma.cc/7P2X-J5TK]. 
 29. Calculated using the coinbaseUSD exchange rate on November 26, 2018 at 9:10 
p.m. For this rate, as well as other rates of exchange, see BITCOINCHARTS, 
https://Bitcoincharts.com [https://perma.cc/4EFV-9J93]. 
 30. See Timothy W. Martin, Eun-Young Jeong & Steven Russolillo, North Korea Is 
Suspected in Bitcoin Heist, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2017, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/north-korea-is-suspected-in-Bitcoin-robbery-1513790899 [https://perma.cc/9YEW-
QVKT (dark archive)]; Rishi Iyengar, More than $70 Million Stolen in Bitcoin Hack, CNN 
(Dec. 8, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/07/technology/nicehash-Bitcoin-theft-hacking/
index.html [https://perma.cc/EBV2-92S3]; Justina Lee, Even a $31 Million Hack Couldn’t 
Keep Bitcoin Down, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:22 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-11-21/bitcoin-falls-after-31-million-theft-of-cryptocurrency-tether 
[https://perma.cc/23EE-9BUQ (dark archive)]; Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. 
Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/03/Bitcoin-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/6WW6-CQ4L (dark 
archive)].  
 31. Finkle & Wagstaff, supra note 28. 
 32. See Matt Levine, Bitcoin Bankruptcy Wasn’t Really a Bust, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 
2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-14/bitcoin-bankruptcy-
wasn-t-really-a-bust [https://perma.cc/SE2E-FD52 (dark archive)]. 
 33. See Lily Katz & Julie Verhage, Bitcoin Exchange Sees Complaints Soar, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2017, 8:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
08-30/bitcoin-exchange-sees-complaints-soar-as-users-demand-money [https://perma.cc/
7ZUY-GLYU (dark archive)] (comparing the 6 complaints about Coinbase in 2016 to at 
least 293 complaints in 2017 filed with the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—
mostly due to “money not available when promised” but with a significant number of 
complaints related to “fraud or scam”); Jen Wieczner, Hacking Coinbase: The Great 
Bitcoin Bank Robbery, FORTUNE (Aug. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/Bitcoin-
coinbase-hack/ [https://perma.cc/8LPZ-LC9T] (noting that complaints to the FBI’s 
Internet Crime Complaint Center concerning “losses from crimes involving virtual 
currency were .	.	. more than triple[d]” in 2016 when compared to 2015).  
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is unlikely that the lost Bitcoin will ever be recovered.34 In a 
normative sense, however, this reaction demonstrates the general 
proposition that victims of unauthorized takings expect protection 
and redress from the traditional source: the government.35 Public 
perception, as alluded to above,36 further supports this normative 
view. Yet, as a prominent member of the Bitcoin community candidly 
admits, “no one .	.	. has gone to jail for .	.	. electronically pilfering 
cryptocurrencies.”37 
This growing tension surrounding unauthorized takings of 
Bitcoin—and the slow pace of actionable steps taken by both 
prosecutors and the government in general—stands in stark contrast 
to prior government responses to innovations in theft. In the not-so-
distant past, both state and federal legislative bodies and law 
enforcement agencies implemented a rigorous approach to theft and 
cybercrime. The National Stolen Property Act (“NSPA”) was an 
initial response to perceived gaps in state larceny laws to counter 
fraudulent transfers of stolen property.38 When the advent of 
computers complicated this scheme, Congress introduced the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) to enlarge prosecutors’ 
toolkits.39 The CFAA was subsequently amended numerous times 
over the following thirty-plus years.40 Prior to its passage, prosecutors 
relied on the mail and wire fraud statutes as a stop-gap measure to 
combat fraud perpetrated in the new computer forum.41 None of the 
 
 34. Finkle & Wagstaff, supra note 28; see also Alexandra Harney & Steve Stecklow, 
Twice Burned – How Mt. Gox’s Bitcoin Customers Could Lose Again, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 
2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/bitcoin-gox/ [https://perma.cc/
TY8Y-KHS3]. 
 35. See NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD 114 (2015) (“[I]n each case of big theft, 
Bitcoin users eventually went to government authorities to seek redress .	.	.	.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Mike Huynh, Latest Bitcoin Theft Bankrupts South Korean 
Cryptocurrency Exchange, D’MARGE (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.dmarge.com/2017/12/
Bitcoin-theft.html [https://perma.cc/NS8Z-HNJP]. Additionally, the article’s subheading, 
“Another day, another stolen Bitcoin” succinctly sums up this perception. Id. 
 37. Wieczner, supra note 33. Coinbase is one of the largest Bitcoin exchanges 
currently in existence, offering both storage services and a platform to facilitate 
transactions in Bitcoin and other digital currencies. About Coinbase, COINBASE, 
https://www.coinbase.com/about [https://perma.cc/3N38-EACX]. 
 38. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of 
Intangible Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 697 (2000) 
[hereinafter Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud]. 
 39. See COMPUT. CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 1 (Scott Eltringham et al. eds., 2010) (explaining that 
Congress created the CFAA, in part, to help address emerging computer crimes that 
current statutes lacked the “tools .	.	. to combat”). 
 40. Id. at 1–3. 
 41. Id. at 1. 
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above provisions, however, has yet been applied to the “electronic[] 
pilfering [of] cryptocurrencies.”42 
With blockchain’s increasing prevalence and the promising 
potential of its widespread application, now is the time for 
prosecutors to act. Not only would prosecution of cryptotheft 
reinforce rule-of-law values, but it would also address societal 
expectations that unauthorized takings of blockchain-based assets are 
what they appear to be—theft. Such prosecutions would achieve the 
critical objectives of regulatory schemes—fostering trust in 
blockchain-based assets and a safe playing field for innovation—in a 
way that would be less onerous to developing blockchain’s uses across 
industries. By targeting the bad actors, as opposed to regulating 
technology’s operation, blockchain developers will retain the freedom 
to continue developing the technology without sacrificing other 
important societal goals and values. 
This Comment argues that prosecutors already have the tools 
necessary to confront this rise in theft.43 To lay the foundation of the 
law of theft, Part I highlights the technical aspects of blockchain 
protocol and Bitcoin that are relevant to this discussion. Tracing 
blockchain’s development explains in part the early—often 
contradictory—efforts to define Bitcoin. It is also crucial to 
understanding why Bitcoin is best understood as property, which in 
turn clarifies the operation of the most common instances of theft 
from online exchanges. Part II then defines Bitcoin. Part III addresses 
the shortcomings of the most applicable federal theft statutes, the 
NSPA and CFAA, when applied to theft of Bitcoin. It then proposes 
that the Wire Fraud provision is a critical stop-gap measure for 
deterring such theft that serves both to protect individuals’ interest in 
Bitcoin and the future development of blockchain protocol. Lastly, 
Part IV argues that prosecutors should move to enforce these 
provisions, while noting the social and economic realities of 
enforcement. It raises questions that Congress, government 
regulators, and the Bitcoin community should consider when 
searching for an equitable solution to this pervasive risk.  
 
 42. Weiczner, supra note 33. 
 43. Bitcoin is implicated in a number of other criminal schemes, all of which fall 
outside the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of other criminal issues involving 
cryptocurrency, see Rainer Böhme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and 
Governance, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 213, 230 (2015). 
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I.  BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOL: THE BASICS 
While blockchain increasingly receives scholarly attention, most 
people’s familiarity with the technology does not extend far past news 
headlines. This is certainly understandable considering that 
blockchain is a product of the relatively niche field of cryptography, 
which is replete with complicated math and deals exclusively in 
source code.44 Furthermore, it seems that most primers on the 
technology are geared toward individual investors with the hope of 
securing that investor’s business.45 As blockchain continues to be 
developed and utilized across business cases, one would expect an 
increase in resources on the subject. This is not to say that in-depth 
analyses of blockchain are nonexistent. On the contrary, a number of 
scholars have already taken up the task of explaining the technical 
and legal implications of certain aspects of the technology. It is from 
these early efforts that an understanding of the application of the law 
of theft may be developed. 
As a preliminary matter, the blockchain protocol allows two 
people to transact without the need for a “trusted third party” 
intermediary.46 What is transacted between them is a specific line of 
code that is mathematically impossible to replicate.47 Every 
transaction is recorded on a publicly accessible ledger—the 
“blockchain.”48 These aspects of blockchain most excite companies, 
investors, and the public at large because the protocol provides a safe, 
transparent, and direct system of exchanging valuable information. 
But a more developed understanding of these basic principles is an 
essential prerequisite to applying criminal provisions.49 
 
 44. Lauri Hartikka, A Blockchain in 200 Lines of Code, MEDIUM (Mar. 4, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@lhartikk/a-blockchain-in-200-lines-of-code-963cc1cc0e54 [https://perma.cc/
5CLX-5CU4]. 
 45. See, e.g., Bitcoin Primer, FIDELITY (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.fidelity.com/
viewpoints/active-investor/beyond-Bitcoin [https://perma.cc/JH27-988G]. 
 46. NAKAMOTO, supra note 5, at 1. For a popular historical account of Bitcoin’s 
development, see generally POPPER, supra note 35. 
 47. Nakamoto uses the phrasing “electronic cash” to describe Bitcoin. NAKAMOTO, 
supra note 5, at 1. 
 48. Id. This Comment addresses only public blockchains. Recently, private 
blockchains operating within a “permissioned network” have become an option for those 
wishing to employ the technology. Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public 
and Private Blockchain, IBM (May 31, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/
2017/05/the-difference-between-public-and-private-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/UH5A-
7BKX]. While the permissioned network might add another layer of security and privacy, 
the underlying blockchain technology remains the same and thus does not alter the 
discussion here. Id. 
 49. This discussion assumes some familiarity with Bitcoin protocol and focuses on the 
most critical aspects of the technology for current purposes. For a more detailed 
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A. How to Create, Transact, and Store Bitcoin 
Public key cryptography—a way of using source code to securely 
transfer information—is far from new. The idea first appeared in a 
white paper in the mid-1970s,50 but it was not until the advent of 
Bitcoin that it received broad public attention. To help communicate 
a complicated topic to the uninitiated, the early Bitcoin advocates 
personified math’s use of “A” and “B” in proofs by creating Alice 
and Bob.51 In the spirit of that convention, this Comment will assume 
the following transaction: Alice sends Bob five Bitcoin. 
Before explaining how the transaction occurs, it is instructive to 
examine where the transaction takes place. Bitcoin transactions occur 
within the Bitcoin network. The network is “peer-to-peer,” meaning 
that the computer servers, commonly called “nodes,” that actively run 
the Bitcoin’s open-source software are linked together.52 Since the 
blockchain protocol is open-source, anyone with an internet 
connection can download and run it on their server.53 So long as a 
node is actively running the software program, it is connected to the 
other nodes on the network. Skipping ahead in the process, peer-to-
peer connection allows Alice and Bob to broadcast their completed 
transaction to all other active nodes.54 It is within this network that 
transactions are eventually confirmed and recorded on the 
 
introduction to the technology, see generally ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND 
CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016). For a 
popular account of the technology’s history and some of its key players, see generally 
POPPER, supra note 35. 
 50. See generally Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in 
Cryptography, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 644 (1976). 
 51. See POPPER, supra note 35, at 9, 11. For an example demonstrating that the 
convention of using “Alice” and “Bob” as hypothetical transactors continues in the 
Bitcoin community, see generally Brian Hayes, Alice and Bob in Cipherspace, AM. 
SCIENTIST, Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 362, https://www.americanscientist.org/article/alice-and-bob-
in-cipherspace [https://perma.cc/K9J4-BPK5]. 
 52. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 66–67. For a brief explanation of the 
different kinds of nodes within the Bitcoin network, a topic outside the scope of this 
Comment, see GHASSAN KARAME & ELLI ANDROULAKI, BITCOIN AND BLOCKCHAIN 
SECURITY 48–49 (2016). 
 53. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 6. 
 54. KARAME & ANDROULAKI, supra note 52, at 49–51. Recently, given strong 
incentives to operate quickly, some developers have created alternative networks that 
interface with the Bitcoin network solely for speedier transmission of transaction 
information. See id. at 52. 
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blockchain.55 The nodes effectively act as managers of the blockchain 
by running the Bitcoin protocol software.56 
Transactions involving blockchain protocol involve a sender and 
a recipient who both rely on cryptography for security and privacy.57 
The first step in completing a transaction can occur offline; that is, 
without access or use of the Bitcoin protocol or the internet.58 To 
begin, Alice first generates a public key using the Elliptic Curve 
Digital Signature Algorithm.59 The public key will be, unsurprisingly, 
publicly available but void of direct links to Alice’s identity. The 
public key is then “hashed” to create Alice’s public address, which 
serves as her identifier to others on the Bitcoin network.60 This public 
address itself, however, does not reveal any personally identifiable 
information about Alice.61 Thus, Alice has anonymity to a point, 
though there are a number of ways that a public address may tip off 
others about the identity of the sender.62 
Alice also generates a private key known only to her.63 While still 
offline,64 Alice creates her message—“send Bob five Bitcoin”—and 
signs it with her private key. The algorithmic combination of Alice’s 
message and private key creates her digital signature.65 The message 
consists of outputs (the five Bitcoin) that she previously received in 
 
 55. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 66–67. 
 56. See Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero 
Member LLC, NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 257, 258, 261 (2014) [hereinafter Bayern, Of 
Bitcoins]. 
 57. For a broader discussion of cryptography used in Bitcoin transactions, see 
FRANCO, supra note 3, at 51–75. See also Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 56, at 1–27. 
 58. See POPPER, supra note 35, at 358. 
 59. Id. at 17–18. The algorithm, initially created by the U.S. government, makes it 
statistically improbable for an “attacker”—defined as someone interested in discovering 
and using your private key—to discover the private key through randomized guesses. See 
id. at 15–18. For a more detailed explanation of the algorithm, see FRANCO, supra note 3, 
at 62–71. 
 60. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 18–19. While the public key is, in some 
sense, an identifier in that the sender’s public key is required for the recipient of the 
transaction to verify it as valid, the recipient cannot determine the sender by the public 
key alone. See FRANCO, supra note 3, at 57. 
 61. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 19–20. As a practical matter, any user may 
have as many addresses as he desires—new pairs of public and private keys may be 
created at any time—and many use this as one way of protecting their identity on the 
blockchain. Id. 
 62. See id. at 143–51. 
 63. Id. at 18–20. 
 64. See POPPER, supra note 35, at 358. 
 65. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 15–19. 
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another transaction.66 Alice then directs the outputs to Bob’s public 
address67 and broadcasts the transaction to all nodes in the Bitcoin 
network, requiring her to be online.68 The nodes can then verify that 
the transaction is valid (i.e., the message was sent from a valid address 
and contains Bitcoin not previously spent by the sender).69 If valid, 
the transaction is then added to a block of recent transactions by 
miners. Miners make up the group of nodes who actively pool all 
transactions to broadcast to the network.70 
This block of transactions is then added to a string of other 
blocks previously created by miners—hence the name “blockchain.”71 
Miners are the nodes that run the blockchain protocol.72 They decide 
which transactions are included and verify the transactions as valid.73 
Then, they receive an incentive to create new blocks for the 
blockchain.74 The incentive comes in the form of a “block reward” to 
the miner of a certain amount of Bitcoin.75 Since all nodes running the 
protocol are gathering all transactions broadcast to the network, the 
node that successfully solves a complicated math equation by 
“hashing” all collected transactions earns the “block award.”76 
The first block is referred to as the “genesis block,” and the 
protocol dictates that the longest chain of blocks is the valid 
blockchain77—that is, all transactions on the longest chain are deemed 
 
 66. This is true even if the sender is herself a miner—in that case, the outputs are 
received in the form of a block reward, as opposed to receiving the outputs from a prior 
transaction. See id. at 38–41. 
 67. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 57. This assumes, of course, that the recipient has also 
generated a public and private key. As of this writing, the operation of generating keys is 
the same for both sender and recipient. 
 68. Id. at 112; NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 29. 
 69. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 78–79. 
 70. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 105. 
 71. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 105. 
 72. Id. at 105–06. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 39. The block reward started at fifty 
Bitcoin and is set to decrease, per Bitcoin protocol, by half for every 210,000 blocks 
created. Id. For the current number of blocks, which is 555,955 as of December 28, 2018, at 
3:00 p.m., requiring a current block reward of 12.5 Bitcoin, as well as the current block 
reward, see BITCOINCHARTS, supra note 29. Transaction fees are the other incentive for 
mining, and one that will become more important when the 21 million Bitcoin limit is 
reached. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 39–40. 
 76. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 105–07. 
 77. Id. at 109. 
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valid, and once recorded, are essentially irreversible.78 The 
blockchain, then, contains the definitive record of transactions and 
unspent outputs in the Bitcoin network. For ease of use, the record of 
all unspent outputs within the Bitcoin protocol is kept in the unspent 
transaction outputs cache (“UTXO”).79 
These unspent outputs recorded on the UTXO are merely bits of 
code existing within blocks on the blockchain.80 As mentioned 
previously, Bitcoin is tied to a specific public address81 and can only 
be accessed using the private key tied to the public address. That is, if 
Alice wants to send Bob five Bitcoin, then (1) Alice must have five 
Bitcoin from a previous transaction; (2) the Bitcoin are accessible to 
Alice through use of Alice’s private key; and (3) the nodes must 
verify that Alice has five Bitcoin by searching the UTXO.82 If it is 
confirmed that Alice does indeed have five Bitcoin, then the 
transaction is approved, and Bob’s public address is now associated 
with the five Bitcoin.83 Thus, this illustrates the importance of the 
private key. 
Since the private key accesses all available Bitcoin associated 
with the corresponding public address, users must protect their 
private key, and most choose to store keys in online exchanges.84 The 
exchange acts as a place where users can keep Bitcoin, exchange 
Bitcoin for fiat currency, and easily make Bitcoin transactions.85 
Others may store them in some form of digital wallet software.86 This 
 
 78. Id. at 107–08; see also Böhme et al., supra note 43, at 219. For a discussion showing 
that this irreversible nature was Satoshi Nakamoto’s original intent, see NAKAMOTO, 
supra note 5, at 1. 
 79. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 79–80. 
 80. This point is crucially important to properly define Bitcoin. See infra Part II. 
 81. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 82. See FRANCO, supra note 3, at 78–79. This example oversimplifies the process, 
retaining—without diluting—the points that are essential to our discussion here. For a full 
discussion of the transaction process, see id. at 77–93. 
 83. See id. at 78–79. This example oversimplifies the process, retaining, without 
diluting, the points that are essential to our discussion here. For a full discussion of the 
transaction process, see id. at 77–93. 
 84. See Mark, 12 Ways to Store Your Bitcoins, NULLTX (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://nulltx.com/12-ways-to-store-your-Bitcoins/ [http://perma.cc/NZ2P-CL3U]. 
 85. See KARAME & ANDROULAKI, supra note 52, at 146. 
 86. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 88. There are a number of other ways that 
private keys may be stored locally, see id. at 76–87, but most of the reported thefts have 
occurred either from online exchanges or online wallet software. See Jeff John Roberts, 
How Bitcoin Is Stolen: 5 Common Threats, FORTUNE (Dec. 8, 2017), http://fortune.com/
2017/12/08/Bitcoin-theft/ [https://perma.cc/3UD2-8EEC]. 
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allows users to store their keys in the cloud, where the keys can be 
accessed by most devices with an internet connection.87 
B. How to Take Bitcoin 
Before it is possible to confirm the recent headlines of Bitcoin 
theft as true legal theft, it is important to examine the type of 
interference concerning individual users’ private keys.88 One of the 
more commonly reported thefts involves compromising an online 
exchange. Exchanges continue to be the most common way for 
individuals to transact in Bitcoin.89 Generally, the exchanges operate 
“off-blockchain,” meaning that they operate on software unrelated to 
the Bitcoin protocol.90 Individuals create accounts on the exchange, 
much like bank accounts, where both cash and private keys can be 
stored.91 The individual can then direct the exchange to use the cash 
to make purchases of Bitcoin.92 In addition, many exchanges also 
offer digital wallet services, permitting cloud-based storage for a 
user’s private keys.93 The exchanges, then, tend to operate as a one-
stop shop, providing a forum for both purchasing and storing 
Bitcoin.94 
The most common form of theft from exchanges involves some 
compromise of the exchange to gain access to exchange users’ private 
keys stored in digital wallets on the exchange.95 Once the thief 
accesses the private keys, he may transfer the Bitcoin associated with 
 
 87. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 88. 
 88. The scope of this Comment is restricted to this interference. There are, of course, 
many other potential violations that might occur surrounding the interference at issue. See, 
e.g., Former Secret Service Agent Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-secret-service-agent-pleads-guilty-
money-laundering [https://perma.cc/D46P-UAT9]. 
 89. Reuters, Cryptocurrency Exchanges Are Increasingly Roiled by Hackings and 
Chaos, FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/29/cryptocurrency-exchanges-
hackings-chaos/ [https://perma.cc/QEA6-NJ52]. 
 90. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 42. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See KARAME & ANDROULAKI, supra note 52, at 146. 
 93. Id. at 146–49. 
 94. BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net [http://perma.cc/Z8M7-PUZM]; COINBASE, 
https://www.coinbase.com/home [https://perma.cc/7FT9-JJJR]; Security, BITFINEX, 
https://www.bitfinex.com/legal/security_policy [https://perma.cc/L3FT-CN5G]. 
 95. See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 30. While outside the scope of this Comment, this 
initial interference, commonly termed “hacking,” may be addressed by various state 
statutes. Computer Crime Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-
access-laws.aspx#Hacking [https://perma.cc/S6W5-CBMC]. In addition, while it may be 
difficult to prosecute theft under current federal provisions, this initial interference may be 
addressed by the CFAA, discussed in Section III.B.2. 
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each private key to his personal addresses.96 Nothing in the 
transaction process, as demonstrated above, initially indicates to the 
network that the transaction is not being made by the legitimate 
owner of the compromised keys—to other nodes on the network, it 
simply appears as if the user herself is completing a transaction. Since 
the transactions initiated by the thief appear valid,97 they are also 
likely to be verified on the network and incorporated into a valid 
block. And, given that reversing these transactions is incredibly 
difficult,98 the rightful owner of the private key is likely forever 
deprived of the lost Bitcoin. 
II.  DEFINING BITCOIN 
The well-worn notion of technology outpacing law99 is especially 
apparent in early efforts to define Bitcoin. As one judge candidly 
admits in a recent opinion, “[n]othing in our frame of references 
allows us to accurately define or describe Bitcoin.”100 This reaction 
may explain, in part, the early efforts by government agencies in this 
regard. Many agencies seeking to define Bitcoin within existing 
regulatory frameworks rely almost exclusively on the way the 
cryptocurrency is used and fail to take on a more searching inquiry 
into what Bitcoin is. This analysis does not align with the traditional 
framework of the law of theft—for something to be an object of theft, 
it must be a thing capable of being stolen. This part details early 
efforts at defining Bitcoin by its use and proceeds to build on the 
argument for the existence of individual property interests in Bitcoin. 
A. Early Use Cases and Definitional Difficulties 
Originally, Bitcoin was simply another effort to create a 
workable system for digital cash. Satoshi Nakamoto, the original 
 
 96. See Mark, supra note 84. Technically, it is likely that the thefts will only 
compromise the private keys in “hot storage,” that is, those that are stored on a system 
that has internet access, by virtue of the fact that a thief with internet access can 
theoretically gain access to the private keys; those in “cold storage,” on the other hand, are 
offline. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 79. Many of the most popular exchanges 
claim to store the vast majority of private key in cold storage. FRANCO, supra note 3, at 41. 
This, however, can fluctuate—if demand for buying and selling increases, presumably 
fewer private keys will remain in “cold storage.” 
 97. The transactions will involve the valid keys of the victim and valid keys of the 
thief. See Mark, supra note 84.  
 98. KARAME & ANDROULAKI, supra note 52, at 146. 
 99. Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-
keep-pace-with-technology/ [http://perma.cc/E48M-Y26U]. 
 100. State v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923, slip op. at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016). 
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developer of blockchain protocol, largely built on the shoulders of the 
so-called cypherphunks, the libertarian advocates for electronic cash 
and other privacy-driven transactional methods who made the first 
efforts in this regard.101 Early advocates strongly pushed for Bitcoin as 
a “new global monetary system,”102 or a new form of cash, both as a 
continuation of libertarian goals and as a way to attractively market 
Bitcoin to the public. On a more practical level, many early 
developers thought that Bitcoin must be valuable in order to 
effectively incentivize miners to continue verifying transactions.103 
Further, many of the early adopters of Bitcoin began to use it as 
currency, albeit in most situations for the purchase of illegal goods.104 
Over time, traditional sources of financial news also adopted the 
language of Bitcoin as money or cryptocurrency.105 While some early 
advocates are backing away from the idea of Bitcoin as money,106 this 
perception continues to exist—a number of judges faced with early 
cases involving Bitcoin unequivocally adopted the monetary 
definition.107 
Others in the Bitcoin, financial, and government communities 
recently have shied away from defining Bitcoin as money and instead 
have argued that it is better defined as a security. Recent guidance 
distributed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
 
 101. See infra text accompanying notes 235–36. 
 102. Erik Voorhees, Bitcoin-The Libertarian Introduction, MONEY & ST. (Apr. 13, 
2012), http://moneyandstate.com/Bitcoin-libertarian-introduction-used-care/ [http://perma.cc/
MSQ6-5T2B]. 
 103. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 47. In fact, Bitcoin’s first proponents 
believed that the profit motive was the only way for the project to operate effectively. See 
id. As mentioned above, however, this motivation is far less important today as 
blockchain’s use cases continue to expand. 
 104. See, e.g., Joshua Bearman, The Rise & Fall of the Silk Road: Part I, WIRED (May 
2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1/ [https://perma.cc/Q8SY-JU39 (dark 
archive)]. 
 105. Rob Copeland, Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund Makes Monster Bet on Bitcoin, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/peter-thiels-founders-fund-makes-big-
bet-on-Bitcoin-1514917433/ [http://perma.cc/4BVG-UNEP]. 
 106. See Erik Voorhees, The Importance of Bitcoin Not Being Money, MONEY & ST. 
(Aug. 8, 2016), http://moneyandstate.com/the-importance-of-Bitcoin-not-being-money/ 
[https://perma.cc/E3RW-ARHC] (clarifying his early position of Bitcoin as “the best 
money mankind had ever seen” by proposing, instead, that “Bitcoin isn’t money after 
all”). 
 107. See State v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923, slip op. at 5–6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016) 
(“Nothing in our frame of references allows us to accurately define or describe Bitcoin.”). 
But see United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (2014) (holding that “Bitcoin 
clearly qualifies as ‘money’” under 18 U.S.C. §	1960); SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 
2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (finding, in dicta, that “Bitcoin is a 
currency or form of money”). 
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states that “virtual coins or tokens .	.	. disseminated using distributed 
ledger or blockchain technology .	.	. may be securities .	.	. subject to 
the federal securities laws.”108 In addition, some foreign governments 
are taking similar steps to recognize Bitcoin as a security.109 Both the 
SEC guidance and foreign government action seem to be mere 
extensions of the legal debate along the same lines.110 Some in the 
tech community are taking up the argument as well.111 
Many Bitcoin advocates and financial observers, however, 
believe that, despite its security-like use by some individuals, inaction 
by the SEC likely dooms this definition.112 This may not be the case 
for blockchain-based cryptocurrencies other than Bitcoin—the SEC, 
for instance, specifically targets initial coin offerings.113 But the 
conclusion that Bitcoin is, in all circumstances, a security appears far 
from settled in the courts. While courts may in theory have the 
authority to broaden the definition of security through statutory 
interpretation,114 many seem hesitant to do so.115 The SEC guidance, 
 
 108. Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
(July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings/ 
[http://perma.cc/WA42-F483]. 
 109. Angelica Ballesteros, Regulators Eye Wider Virtual Currency Use, MANILA TIMES 
(Nov. 22, 2017), http://www.manilatimes.net/regulators-eye-wider-virtual-currency-use/364344/ 
[http://perma.cc/42BN-RUJ5]. 
 110. See, e.g., Burks, supra note 20, at 246; Dan Stroh, Article, Secure Currency or 
Security? The SEC and Bitcoin Regulation, U. CIN. L. REV. (Nov. 18, 2014), 
https://uclawreview.org/2014/11/18/secure-currency-or-security-the-sec-and-Bitcoin-regulation/ 
[http://perma.cc/KF6B-LSG8]. 
 111. See, e.g., Mario Lattuga, Yes, Bitcoin Will Be Regulated by the SEC. Here’s Why:, 
MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2017), https://medium.com/@mlattuga1/yes-Bitcoin-is-probably-a-security-
heres-why-4f6410d9787c/ [http://perma.cc/L99C-GK9S]. 
 112. See PETER VAN VALKENBURG, COIN CTR., FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITIES 
REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES 50–54 (2016), https://coincenter.org/wpcontent/
uploads/2016/01/SECFramework2.5.pdf/ [http://perma.cc/5349-5DE8]. Another knowledgeable 
author on the subject rightly notes that “if [the SEC] thought Bitcoin was a security, [it] 
would probably have done something about it by now.” See Matt Levine, SEC Halts a 
Real Initial Coin Offering, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Dec. 12, 2017, 3:20 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-12/sec-halts-a-real-initial-coin-offering#
footnote-1513099636855/ [https://perma.cc/HC42-PR5A (dark archive)].  
 113. Id. For a brief primer on the concept of Initial Coin Offerings, see Gregory J. 
Nowak & Joseph C. Guagliardo, Blockchain and Initial Coin Offerings: SEC Provides 
First U.S. Securities Law Guidance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE FIN. REG. 
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/09/blockchain-and-initial-coin-offerings-
sec-provides-first-u-s-securities-law-guidance/ [http://perma.cc/YX8Q-DMLN]. 
 114. Steven J. Cleveland, Resurrecting Court Deference to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission: Definition of “Security,” 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 273, 300–01 (2013). 
 115. See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 6, 2013). While the court did not specifically hold that Bitcoin itself is a security 
under the Securities Acts, it did hold that investments in a company that bought and sold 
Bitcoin are considered securities. Id. at *2. Specifically in the criminal context, courts 
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often a reliable source of interpretive help for the courts,116 does not 
offer much clarity since its language—that Bitcoin and other virtual 
currencies may be securities—leaves ample room for disagreement. 
Still other government actions focus on Bitcoin’s myriad of other 
uses to situate it neatly within their respective regulatory frameworks. 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FINCEN”) considers 
those dealing in Bitcoin to be “money transmitters” and recently 
brought actions against certain exchanges for alleged money 
laundering.117 This action implicitly acknowledges monetary 
properties in Bitcoin. Other agency actions mirror this trend. The 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), without defining the term 
explicitly, equates Bitcoin to “real currency” and thus subjects income 
in Bitcoin to taxation.118 The Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”), on the other hand, considers Bitcoin to be a 
commodity, and its regulatory action similarly reflects this 
disposition.119 While the list is long and varied, a unifying strand runs 
through each effort at definition—the focus is constrained to Bitcoin’s 
use, and no further. That is not to say that this definition is without 
value. At the same time, however, it side-steps the important inquiry 
into what Bitcoin is. 
B. The Case for Property Interests in Bitcoin 
The technical description of Bitcoin leads to an intuitive 
assumption that individuals have intangible property interests in it—
 
consistently rely on the rule of lenity to avoid broadening criminal statutes beyond the 
boundaries delineated by Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 82 
(2d Cir. 2012) (finding that, under 18 U.S.C. §	1832(a), a high frequency trading system of 
a global bank, relatively new technology first implemented around the time of the 
decision, was not “‘produced for’ nor ‘placed in’ interstate or foreign commerce” within 
the meaning of the statute). 
 116. See Cleveland, supra note 114, at 301. 
 117. FinCEN Fines BTC-e Virtual Currency Exchange $110 Million for Facilitating 
Ransomware, Dark Net Drug Sales, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (July 27, 
2017), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-fines-btc-e-virtual-currency-exchange-
110-million-facilitating-ransomware/ [http://perma.cc/6QZ9-2YPL]; see also FIN. CRIMES 
ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-R011, REQUEST FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN'S REGULATIONS TO A 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM 1 (2014), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/
rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-R011.pdf [http://perma.cc/HL78-LDHQ]. 
 118. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938. 
 119. CFTC Orders Bitcoin Options Trading Platform Operator and Its CEO to Cease 
Illegally Offering Bitcoin Options and to Cease Operating a Facility for Trading or 
Processing of Swaps Without Registering, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 
COMMISSION (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7231-15 
[http://perma.cc/R5GT-V5WU]. 
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that it is something capable of being owned to the exclusion of the 
whole world. As discussed above, Bitcoin is, by its nature, intangible. 
It is nothing other than electronic data, a string of “bits” hosted on 
software without any physical existence. And the holder of the private 
key is the only individual who may access, transact, or transfer the 
associated Bitcoin. Concluding that Bitcoin is legally the object of 
theft requires, however, more than a bare assumption. This is critical 
for purposes of the theft analysis—for something to be impermissibly 
taken, it must first be owned exclusively. 
“The act of stealing—of unlawfully treating tuum as meum” is 
necessarily predicated on the idea that what is yours, which I treat as 
mine, is actually yours.120 Naturally, this seems to imply principles of 
ownership and thus property interests.121 To address theft of Bitcoin, 
then, someone who claims rights of ownership in Bitcoin must, in fact, 
have those rights in the first place.122 
The Supreme Court has not found property interests to stem 
from the Constitution;123 rather, the Court looks to “existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law” to define when a person has an interest in property.124 States are 
varied in their approach to intangible interests in property. North 
Carolina property law, for example, is unclear as to whether 
intangible property rights exist, at least insofar as it pertains to 
conversion claims.125 To bring a conversion action in North Carolina, 
a plaintiff must show “ownership [of goods or personal chattels] .	.	. 
and a wrongful conversion by defendant.”126 Intangible interests “such 
 
 120. See GREEN, supra note 22, at 1. 
 121. See Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 684. The Supreme Court has 
noted that “property is a creation of the law” and “the law limits rights of property 
according to the public interest and when public policy demands it.” Id. at 695. 
 122. See id. In fact, whether the intangible item is property continues to be a central 
issue in cases concerning theft of the item. See id. at 696.  
 123. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005). 
 124. Id. Some argue that this approach “leads to the confusing possibility of fifty 
different versions” of property interests under federal provisions, and, thus, the federal 
courts should be hesitant to use state law in defining property under federal statutes. See 
Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 715–16. The plain language of the Court, 
however, does not seem to constrain the use of state law, despite this cautionary note. Id. 
 125. See Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 264, 278 S.E.2d 501, 506 (1981) (defining 
conversion as “an authorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over 
goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the 
exclusion of an owner’s rights” (quoting Peed v. Burleson, Inc., 244 N.C. 437, 439, 94 
S.E.2d 351, 353 (1956))). 
 126. See Gallimore v. Sink, 27 N.C. App. 65, 67, 218 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1975) (citing Wall 
v. Colvard, Inc., 268 N.C. 43, 49, 149 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1966); and then citing Vinson v. 
Knight, 137 N.C. 408, 408, 49 S.E. 891, 892 (1905)). 
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as business opportunities and expectancy interests” are not goods or 
personal chattels and thus are not “owned” for purposes of 
conversion.127 This finding seems to hinge on whether or not the 
property interest is “reduced to tangible form.”128 This makes sense—
courts appear to be worried about overextending property 
protections to items too ethereal to adequately define. But it may also 
be attributed to the historical lack of intangible goods that one could 
reasonably claim ownership over. 
At the same time, however, when reading the Court’s language 
closely, state law is but one of many sources that may be persuasive in 
determining property rights. North Carolina law, and other states for 
that matter, may not have the definitive last word. To this end, federal 
court decisions have not constrained the analysis of intangible rights 
to state law choices. Continuing with North Carolina as an example in 
this regard, one federal district court has held that, “as a matter of 
law, electronic data and computer software is intangible property.”129 
Kremen v. Cohen,130 a recent decision in the Ninth Circuit, further 
broadens, if only incrementally, the test for determining intangible 
property rights. There, the Court held that an intangible good is a 
property interest if it meets three requirements: (1) the interest must 
be “capable of precise definition,” (2) “it must be capable of exclusive 
possession and control,” and (3) some individual must be able to 
make a “legitimate claim” of ownership.131 Both examples, at the very 
least, unmoor the concept of individual property rights from 
tangibility and thus open the door for recognition of property 
interests in Bitcoin. 
Other sources of law and government agency actions further 
indicate a shift in recognizing intangible property interests. Black’s 
Law Dictionary, for instance, seems amenable to defining Bitcoin as 
property.132 Bitcoin, anecdotally, is pledged as collateral in 
 
 127. Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 140 N.C. App. 390, 414, 537 S.E.2d 
248, 264 (2000). 
 128. HCW Ret. & Fin. Servs. LLC v. HCW Emp. Benefit Servs. LLC, No. 10 CVS 
1447, 2015 WL 4238193, at *21 (N.C. Bus. Ct. July 14, 2015). 
 129. See Capitol Comm’n Inc. v. Capitol Ministries, 2013 WL 5493013, at *12 
(E.D.N.C. 2013) (citing Am. Online Inc., v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 96 (4th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 130. 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 131. Id. at 1030 (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 
958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 132. Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Intangible 
Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Property that lacks a physical 
existence.”); see, e.g., James D. Lamm et al., The Digital Death Conundrum: How Federal 
97 N.C. L. REV. 395 (2019) 
414 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
compliance with Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, and the 
Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act from the Uniform 
Law Commission folds Bitcoin into trust and estates law.133 
Furthermore, actions and statements of other government agencies 
seem to support this definition. The actions of the SEC, FINCEN, 
and the CFTC indicate recognition of individual interests in Bitcoin—
whether a security, money, or a commodity (if it happens to be any), 
ownership must be attributable to an individual.134 The IRS, although 
limiting the definition to “federal tax purposes,” explicitly labels 
Bitcoin and other virtual currency as property.135 Additionally, 
Bitcoin is subject to both civil and criminal forfeiture, as evidenced by 
the U.S. Marshals Service’s recent auctions.136 
The multiplicity of sources above suggests that many areas of the 
law are amenable to Bitcoin’s definition as intangible personal 
property. As a result, Bitcoin easily satisfies the Ninth Circuit’s three-
part test. Returning to the example above, Bob’s interest definitively 
lies in the outputs associated with his public address. And the outputs 
(Bitcoin) are capable of precise definition—each output is a specific, 
unique line of code. Further, Bitcoin is, by nature, exclusively held 
and controlled because Bob controls his own private key. Bob’s 
interest in Bitcoin would be diminished, if not extinguished, if it were 
not capable of exclusive control. And the blockchain ledger 
announces to “all the world” that the Bitcoin belongs to Bob, and he, 
as exclusive holder of the private key, is the only person who can 
make a legitimate claim to the Bitcoin.137 As indicated above, other 
 
and State Laws Prevent Fiduciaries from Managing Digital Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
385, 388 (2014). 
 133. J. Dax Hansen & Joshua L. Boehm, Treatment of Bitcoin Under U.S. Property 
Law, PERKINS COIE 11–14 (Mar. 2017), https://www.virtualcurrencyreport.com/wp-content/
uploads/sites/13/2017/03/2016_ALL_Property-Law-Bitcoin_onesheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/
N6RF-RLV9]; Nate Lanxon, Bitcoin Industry Grapples with Age-Old Problem of 
Inheritance, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2018, 5:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-02-13/bitcoin-industry-grapples-with-age-old-problem-of-inheritance 
[http://perma.cc/YQ3W-MX8G (dark archive)]. 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 118–20. 
 135. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938.  
 136. FOR SALE 2,719.32669068 Bitcoins, U.S. MARSHALS SERV., 
https://www.usmarshals.gov/assets/2016/Bitcoinauction/ [http://perma.cc/3GXF-6DY8]. 
 137. It is important to mention here the problem of double-spending. It is sufficient for 
the purpose of this Comment to note that Bitcoin protocol generally prevents (again, 
relying on the earlier example) Alice from sending five Bitcoin to Bob, then proceeding to 
send the same five Bitcoin to Carl. For a more detailed explanation of the double-spend 
problem, see FRANCO, supra note 3, at 113–17. In addition, while this analysis serves the 
purposes here, others have analyzed this Ninth Circuit test in more detail. See Hansen & 
Boehm, supra note 133, at 7–8. 
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legal entities are prepared, or have already taken a definitive step, to 
recognize this interest. The weight of evidence to date, then, strongly 
indicates the existence of intangible property interests in Bitcoin. 
If an ownership interest does exist in Bitcoin, as the above 
analysis suggests,138 the question remains as to when the holder of the 
interest can claim that interest “against the world.” To this end, it is 
important to briefly consider when the interest in ownership of 
Bitcoin might vest; that is, when the right is “completed .	.	. for 
present enjoyment.”139 Once the interest vests, a deprivation of that 
interest—here, a total loss of possession and use—is the point at 
which theft occurs.140 Again applying these concepts to the 
hypothetical transaction in this Comment, once Alice’s transaction to 
Bob is confirmed and included in a valid block, Bob’s interest in the 
five Bitcoin vests. At that point, the right is “completed” in that the 
five Bitcoin are attributable to Bob, and only Bob’s private key can 
facilitate use of the Bitcoin transferred to him.141 Therefore, theft 
occurs when someone other than Bob takes control of Bob’s private 
key and completes a transfer to another public address. 
III.  APPLYING THE LAW OF THEFT 
Proceeding on the assumption that individuals possess intangible 
property interests in Bitcoin, its owner then must be afforded the 
“right against interference with possession from the world at large.”142 
And this right necessarily implicates the law of theft—punishment for 
violating that right is critical to both deterrence and public confidence 
in its protection. To this end, the Model Penal Code has defined the 
proper object of theft as “anything of value,” including “intangible 
personal property,”143 seemingly in an effort to broaden the 
 
 138. See Shawn Bayern, Dynamic Common Law and Technological Change: The 
Classification of Bitcoin, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 22, 33–34 (2014) [hereinafter 
Bayern, Dynamic Common Law] (arguing for a functional approach to recognize rights of 
property in Bitcoin to match what individual holders already assume they own). 
 139. Vested, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 140. See Tigar, supra note 25, at 1448. 
 141. See Hansen & Boehm, supra note 133, at 9. 
 142. Bayern, Dynamic Common Law, supra note 138, at 31. Black’s Law Dictionary 
includes as rights of an owner of property the “right to possess and use, the right to 
exclude, and the right to transfer.” Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 143. See MODEL PENAL CODE §	223.0 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (defining “property” for 
purposes of the provisions concerning theft as “anything of value” that includes items of 
“intangible personal property”). It is also interesting to note that this definition appears to 
stem from the Model Penal Code’s choice to favor elimination of the common law 
distinctions between types of theft, consolidating the offense to a single crime that covers a 
broad array of interests. See Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 687–88. 
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protections of the criminal law. The critical question, however, is not 
whether intangible property rights are objects of theft in the abstract; 
it is rather “whether the victim’s loss constituted property for 
purposes of the statute being considered.”144  
Two statutes, the NSPA and the CFAA, appear at first glance to 
provide potential solutions. Both statutes were enacted in response to 
pervasive issues of theft that created difficulties for state law 
enforcement. The NSPA sought to confront the problem of thieves 
escaping over state lines,145 while the CFAA focused on theft by 
hacking that arose with the escalating use of computers.146 By 
analyzing their application, courts may find adequate justification to 
extend the statutes to encompass Bitcoin theft. At the very least, this 
discussion should provide lawmakers with the necessary bases to 
amend the statutes to accommodate this new form of taking. 
The strongest argument, and the statute most apt to deal with 
Bitcoin theft, is 18 U.S.C. §	1343, the Federal Wire Fraud statute. 
Long a favorite of federal prosecutors, the statute appears to be the 
perfect tool, from both a policy and legal perspective, to combat 
Bitcoin theft. The following discussion lays out the argument that 
must be made in this regard and will provide a roadmap for 
prosecution of theft of any blockchain-based crypto-asset. 
A. The National Stolen Property Act 
Enacted in 1934, the NSPA bars the “transport[], transmi[ssion], 
or transfer[] in interstate or foreign commerce [of] any goods, wares, 
merchandise, securities, or money, of the value of $5000 or more, 
knowing the same to have been stolen, converted, or taken by 
fraud.”147 When interpreting this statute, courts will find a violation of 
the statute if an individual “(1) transports or causes to be transported; 
(2) in interstate commerce; (3) [goods, wares, merchandise, securities, 
or money] valued at $5,000 or more; (4) with knowledge that the 
property has been stolen, converted, or fraudulently taken from its 
rightful owner.”148 The NSPA, however, treats only the symptom and 
not the disease—only transporting stolen goods, not the theft of those 
goods, is prohibited. At the same time, it is an effective tool for 
 
 144. Id. at 686. 
 145. Id. at 697. 
 146. Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private 
Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 751 (2013). 
 147. 18 U.S.C. §	2314 (2012). 
 148. Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 697–98. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 395 (2019) 
2019] CYBER PICKPOCKETS 417 
deterrence of theft.149 But a key issue in applying the NSPA to Bitcoin 
theft lies in the courts’ uncertain treatment of intangible property. 
This problem, however, can be overcome. 
Courts often conflate the first two elements and simply ask 
whether the item was transferred through interstate commerce. 
Generally speaking, the Supreme Court has historically construed 
“interstate commerce” broadly.150 Lower courts, however, appear 
divided as to whether, for the purpose of criminal statutes, the term 
encompasses internet transmissions of intangible items of property. 
Some require a showing that the internet transmission itself did in fact 
cross state lines—that is, an intangible item was transmitted from a 
server in one state to a server in another.151 Other courts merely 
require a showing that the transmission used the internet.152 In other 
criminal statutes, Congress specifically defines use of the internet as 
within “interstate commerce,” but it has not amended the NSPA to 
that effect.153 
Unfortunately, Congress left “goods, wares merchandise, 
securities or money” undefined without explanation.154 In response, 
courts often rely on various common law methods to interpret these 
terms.155 Generally, courts have found that some “physical identity 
between the property stolen and property transported” must be 
present.156 This holding appears to hinge on depriving the owner of 
use—physical takings, by necessity, accomplish this. To this end, the 
Supreme Court found the NSPA inapplicable to theft of copyright, 
basing this holding primarily on the fact that copyright infringement 
 
 149. See id. at 697. 
 150. See McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 652–54 (1982). 
 151. See generally Valeria G. Luster, Note, Let’s Reinvent the Wheel: The Internet as a 
Means of Interstate Commerce in United States v. Kieffer, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 589 (2015) 
(discussing at length the split between federal courts). The Supreme Court has not stepped 
in to resolve this divide and the many other issues presented with use of the internet in 
criminal statutes. Id. at 590. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 596–97. 
 154. United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2012); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL §	1312 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/usam/
criminal-resource-manual-1312-national-stolen-property-act-goods-wares-merchandise 
[https://perma.cc/5JLK-XGWN]. 
 155. See Tamara J. Wayland, Note, Computer Technology—The National Stolen 
Property Act and its Applicability to Property Rights in Computer Source Code—Do Rights 
Exist?—United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991), 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & 
TECH. J. 155, 161 (1992). 
 156. Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 698; see also Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 
at 77. 
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does not totally deprive the holder of use.157 In addition, other lower 
courts have held that the NSPA does not cover “purely intangible 
property” that lacks any physical element.158 Courts premise the 
“physical taking” holding on the fact that such a physical taking 
clearly deprives the rightful owner of use, often completely.159 In each 
of the above cited cases, however, theft of intangible property did not 
lead to complete deprivation of use.160 
Therefore, this statute will not apply to the act of taking an 
individual’s private key.161 It, however, likely covers the unlawful 
transfer of Bitcoin from the rightful owner to the thief’s public 
address.162 Bitcoin transactions occur on the Bitcoin network; an 
internet connection plus the proper software are required.163 The 
transmission of Bitcoin over the Bitcoin network remains 
substantially unaddressed by Congress and courts—Congress’s silence 
in this regard remains unhelpful. It may be argued, then, that 
Supreme Court precedent dictates a broad reading of the interstate 
commerce element in the NSPA—this transfer, if accomplished via 
the internet, occurs in interstate commerce. In addition, technological 
properties of the Bitcoin network allow for an easy inference that, 
since the transaction is broadcast to all nodes on the network, and it is 
verifiable that operating nodes exist in more than one state, the 
transmission crossed state lines.164 
The central difficulty in prosecuting Bitcoin theft under the 
NSPA largely resides in classifying Bitcoin as a “good, ware, or 
merchandise.” Courts recognize that the statute, crafted in the 1930s, 
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73–75. 
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 161. See Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud, supra note 38, at 697 n.88 (noting that 
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 162. As mentioned above, this transfer requires the use of the rightful owner’s private 
key—other nodes will not verify the transaction unless the hash of the user’s private key 
and the message containing Bitcoin are confirmed. See supra Section I.A. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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does not comport with modern realities and creates ambiguities.165 
Courts, however, seem reluctant to stray from the “physical taking” 
requirement until Congress says otherwise.166  
At the same time, in spite of the lack of a physical element, the 
theft of Bitcoin differs from other takings of intangible property in 
one critical aspect—once a user’s private key is stolen, this completely 
deprives the user of its use, and any subsequent transaction involving 
Bitcoin tied to the user’s private key is irreversible.167 Thus, Bitcoin 
theft more closely mirrors the taking of a physical item—both owners 
are completely deprived of use of the thing—as opposed to business 
information or other forms of intangible property that courts have 
thus far been reluctant to recognize.  
B. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Another statute that may provide a basis for criminal 
prosecution for theft of Bitcoin is the CFAA.168 Originally enacted in 
the 1980s, the CFAA initially targeted improper access of 
government computers.169 Congress subsequently amended the 
CFAA five times to meet the growing number of criminal actions 
related to the increased use of computers by the general public.170 To 
this end, the statute is typically applied in cases of “computer 
intrusion or hacking.”171 The CFAA now provides for forfeiture of 
“any property, real or personal,” gained by violation of the Act, 
providing compensatory relief to victims of the fraud proscribed.172 
 
 165. See United States v. Zhang, 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 348–49 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 166. See United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 167. See supra Section I.B. Additionally, one district court noted in dicta that “courts 
have liberally construed” the terms to cover “personal property and chattels that are 
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NSPA by requiring a physical taking. United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 421 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990). This interpretation, coupled with the complete deprivation of use involved in 
Bitcoin theft, may be enough to overcome the tangibility requirement in arguing NSPA’s 
application to theft of Bitcoin. 
 168. 18 U.S.C. §	1030 (2012). 
 169. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 4 (1986).  
 170. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 
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 172. 18 U.S.C. §	1030(i) (2012). 
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1.  18 U.S.C. §	1030(a)(2): Accessing a Computer and Obtaining 
Information 
In relevant part, the provision defines as criminal any actor who 
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access, and thereby obtains .	.	. information from any 
protected computer.”173 The Act fails to define the statute’s first term, 
“intentional access of a computer.”174 Currently, however, courts do 
not constrain the statute through this element.175 Rather, “any 
internet-related transmission .	.	. that results in the user’s computer 
‘accessing a series of networked computers’” will suffice.176 Similar to 
“intentional access,” Congress gives no definition of “without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access,” and courts have largely 
not offered an interpretation.177 In light of this uncertainty, the courts 
rely on the dictionary to define the term as “access .	.	. without 
permission or approval.”178 Ostensibly, the one who controls access to 
the information is the one who may grant, or deny, permission.179 
Lastly, the statute fails to define “information.”180 But the report on 
the 1996 amendments to §	1030(a)(2) offers guidance, specifically 
designating “information stored in intangible form” as falling within 
the statutory language.181 Further, obtaining such intangible 
information is interpreted broadly and may be accomplished by 
“merely reading it.”182 
In contrast, Congress does define a “protected computer” as one 
“which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”183 
Congress intended the use of “affect” in the definition to demonstrate 
an intent for the provision to “reach as far as the Commerce Clause of 
 
 173. Id. §	1030(a)(2). 
 174. Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1464 (2016). 
 175. Id. at 1468. 
 176. Id. at 1465. 
 177. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” 
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1616–17 (2003) (noting that existing 
interpretations of the term, when given, are often in conflict) [hereinafter Kerr, 
Cybercrime’s Scope]; Kerr, Vagueness Challenges, supra note 170, at 1572 (noting 
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 178. Bellia, supra note 174, at 1468–69. 
 179. See WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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 180. Czech v. Wall St. on Demand, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 181. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7 (1996). 
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the Constitution permits.”184 To this end, many courts have held that a 
computer’s connection to the internet is sufficient to qualify it as a 
“protected computer.”185 Some commenters, in support of this point, 
make the inference that since all “internet-connected computer[s] 
[are] used in interstate communication,” the computers are, by 
nature, in interstate commerce for purposes of this section.186 Other 
courts have relied on the connection between the computer that is 
accessed and those who are interacting with its software, inferring 
“interstate commerce” from such an interaction that crosses state 
lines.187 
Applied to theft of private keys, a forceful argument may be 
made for prosecution under §	1030(a)(2). The thief necessarily must 
intentionally use the internet to access the exchange’s stored private 
keys; what remains is a showing that the exchange’s computers are 
“networked.” Given the technical description of the Bitcoin network 
above, this element is met with little difficulty—each node running 
blockchain software is part of a network that is constantly receiving 
transactions broadcast to it. And active nodes are spread out both 
among multiple states and internationally.188 Showing “without 
authorization” presents little difficulty as well: hackers, by common 
definition,189 do not have permission to access the exchange’s 
network,190 at least assuming that the online exchange has not given 
the thief this permission.191 And Bitcoin outputs, as lines of code, are 
most simply defined as “information.”192 Intangibility is of no 
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 185. See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 457 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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 188. Global Bitcoin Nodes Distribution, BITNODES, https://bitnodes.earn.com 
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ed. 2014). 
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 192. One common definition of “information” is “the attribute inherent in and 
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consequence—the amendment reports mentioned above support this 
reading, and others forcefully put forward this argument.193 Lastly, 
much like the NSPA, the “protected computer” element will depend 
on the jurisdiction—one must show that the exchange was connected 
to the internet or that the exchange’s users, those “interacting” with 
the computer’s software, were located across state lines.  
The difficulty with prosecution under this statute is its breadth, 
attributable to both statutory amendments and court interpretation, 
leaving prosecutions under the CFAA susceptible to vagueness 
attacks. Orin Kerr has argued that this breadth requires courts to 
engage in narrow statutory interpretation, which would appear to cast 
doubt on the above analysis.194 As the doctrine stands, however, 
§	1030(a)(2) appears to provide a viable path for prosecution. At the 
very least, such a prosecution may draw Congress’s attention to the 
changing application of the statute and the need for more precise 
definition of terms outpaced by technology.  
2.  18 U.S.C. §	1030(a)(4): Accessing to Defraud and Obtain Value 
In relevant part, §	1030(a)(4) bars 
knowingly and with intent to defraud, access[ing] a protected 
computer without authorization .	.	. and by means of such 
conduct further[ing] the intended fraud and obtain[ing] 
anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing 
obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value 
of such use is not more than $5,000 in any one year period.195 
“Knowingly and with intent to defraud” is not defined by statute, but 
Senate and House reports discussing the CFAA refer to the phrase in 
the context of its use in 18 U.S.C. §	1029.196 Under §	1029, prosecutors 
must show “the property wrongfully obtained via computer furthers 
the intended fraud” and knowledge by the defrauder of this fact.197 
Fraud is “furthered” when the property obtained later is used to 
 
(as .	.	. binary digits in a computer program) that produce specific effects.” Information, 
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commit the fraud intended.198 The meaning of “fraud,” however, 
remains undefined, and the common-law development of the term is 
unsettled.199 Some courts, in an apparent desire for uniformity of 
meaning, equate fraud under §	1030(a)(4) to its use in the wire fraud 
statute.200 This meaning, described below, is extraordinarily broad. 
Other courts, addressing the same section in a civil context, interpret 
the language more broadly to cover any “wrongdoing”201 that 
deprives someone of a thing of value.202 Lastly, the “access of a 
protected computer” and “authorization” elements track 
§	1030(a)(2).203 
Returning to the prototypical theft described above, this statute 
might apply with similar force as §	1030(a)(2). The mens rea 
elements—knowledge and intent to commit fraud—are easily met. 
Hackers, again by definition, are likely knowing participants who aim 
to commit fraud. If fraud is given its civil meaning of “wrongdoing,” 
depriving exchange users of private keys by hacking, a harm explicitly 
targeted by the CFAA, almost certainly fits within the statutory 
definition.204 Finally, the fraud is “furthered” under this definition 
when the thief uses the private keys to transfer Bitcoin from the 
rightful owner to a public address controlled by the thief.205 
The likely challenge to prosecution under this statute is whether 
Bitcoin meets the definition of “anything of value.” Whether Bitcoin 
is “valuable,” in the sense of possessing intrinsic monetary value, is a 
point of disagreement.206 But any item is “valuable” in that individuals 
are willing to buy and sell it at a market price. This is arguably the 
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most natural reading of the term “value” as used in the statute. 
“Value” is not modified by either “intrinsic” or “monetary”; rather, 
“anything” seems to imply a broad definitional standard of “value.” It 
is clear, through news headlines and otherwise, that Bitcoin is bought 
and sold daily for significant sums.207 
Again, however, as with §	1030(a)(2) above, this broad language 
may leave prosecutions under the statute susceptible to vagueness 
challenges. But a similar proscriptive solution is apt here as well—
until Congress makes the choice to amend the statute, and so long as 
courts interpret its language in the way described above, the path to 
prosecution of Bitcoin theft is viable.  
C. 18 U.S.C. §	1343: Wire Fraud 
The mail fraud provision, §	1341, and its “sister provision”208 
covering wire fraud, §	1343,209 have long been a favorite of federal 
prosecutors.210 Section 1343 implicates those 
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits 
or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or 
television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, 
any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose 
of executing such scheme or artifice .	.	.	.211 
Because of courts’ historically broad interpretation of the statute, it 
remains prosecutors’ “first line of defense against virtually every new 
area of fraud to develop in the United States.”212 The statutes are 
aimed at frauds concerning property, and both have their “origin in 
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the desire to protect individual property rights.”213 Partly in 
recognition of this underlying principle, and considering Congress’s 
choice to use almost identical language in §	1343 as in §	1341, the 
Court interprets this identical language “in pari materia.”214 
Predictably, the elements of §	1343 mirror those of §	1341,215 reflecting 
an intent by Congress to simply extend §	1341’s principles to frauds 
committed using a new medium.216 The elements that must be met are 
uncomplicated—the government must establish that the defendant 
intended to carry out a scheme to defraud and used wires to further 
that scheme.217 And if the government meets its burden, it establishes 
a predicate offense to other potential criminal sanctions.218 
The “schemes to defraud” included under §	1343 are, in the 
words of some commentators, “too numerous to catalog.”219 Some 
suggest that its theoretical limits stretch to encompass not only 
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common law conceptions of fraud220 but any scheme that involves 
“intent to take property by deception,” far exceeding the common 
law principles deeply rooted in the law of theft.221 In a few instances 
where the Court sought to narrow the scope of objects subject to 
fraud, Congress immediately responded with amendments to 
encompass the objects recently excluded.222 At the very least, the 
Supreme Court recognizes property interests—both tangible and 
intangible223—as objects of fraudulent schemes.224 In addition, the 
scheme may not, in fact, cause loss by the victim or benefit to the 
fraudster, nor is this required; rather, the scheme to defraud simply 
“must be material to the contemplated transaction.”225 
The use of wires must also be interstate. Some courts require a 
showing that the transmission by wire, in fact, crossed state lines.226 
However, the same division that exists in application of the term in 
the CFAA exists here—other courts merely require demonstrated use 
of the internet to be interstate.227 In addition, the wire use must be in 
furtherance of the scheme to defraud.228 The Court chooses to 
interpret this element broadly and generally incorporates the analysis 
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into the mens rea requirement.229 To that end, any use of wires not 
required by law and intended to perpetrate fraud is enough to 
establish furtherance of the fraud.230 
Applied to Bitcoin theft, §	1343 requires the least “extension” of 
statutory language and principles and, therefore, is the best path for 
prosecution. It appears clear that the property interest at stake, 
ownership of Bitcoin, is gained by deception in the prototypical theft. 
This is most true when the exchange software is hacked, the user’s 
private keys are compromised, and the thief completes an 
unauthorized transaction. It is likely equally true when hackers 
exploit a flaw in an exchange’s security mechanisms—the deception, 
in this instance, lies in the surreptitious search for the flaw only for 
purposes of wrongdoing. In many cases intent will not be difficult to 
prove—the hacker, through the act of hacking or deception, intends 
to defraud users of the host exchange. Further, private keys may be 
analogized to other forms of intangible property the Court 
recognizes.231 The wires in this case, the internet connection used to 
facilitate the hack, are used in furtherance of the scheme. Lastly, the 
wire use is likely interstate: in most jurisdictions, prosecutors need to 
show that the origination of use of the wire occurred across state lines 
from the servers hosting the exchange. Given the reality of the 
modern internet, and the Bitcoin network described above, the 
showing required by many courts will be perfunctory.232 
Section 1343, then, is the best vehicle for prosecution of Bitcoin 
theft. It aligns the congressional purposes behind the statute—a stop-
gap for new forms of wrongdoing—with language amenable to 
encompassing the intricacies that blockchain presents. This stop-gap 
function, moreover, will become increasingly important if, or perhaps 
more likely when, blockchain-based assets become commonplace as a 
way to move and store valuable information.  
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IV.  EXTRA-LEGAL OBSTACLES TO ENFORCEMENT OF CRYPTO-
ASSET THEFT 
While a solid path to prosecution appears to exist, the 
application of criminal provisions to theft of Bitcoin does not come 
without substantial challenges. As noted above, no one has been 
convicted of theft of crypto-assets. Prosecutors seem to prefer to 
charge the effects of theft—money laundering of proceeds derived 
from selling stolen Bitcoin—by waiting until the thief converts Bitcoin 
to cash.233 There are a number of reasons for this approach, and this 
discussion will focus on two in particular: resistance from the Bitcoin 
community to regulation in any form and the many difficulties Bitcoin 
poses for law enforcement. But as the use cases for blockchain grow 
and are implemented, addressing these challenges and overcoming 
the legal hurdles to prosecution are essential. 
A. The Bitcoin Community 
The predecessors of Bitcoin trace their roots to libertarian 
politics of the early 1980s, which valued absolute privacy and freedom 
from any government intervention.234 The earliest advocates of digital 
cash235 envisioned complex source code and cryptography as the 
avenue to achieve both of those key values.236 This led many of the 
same advocates to begin the search for and development of code 
written to provide individuals with complete anonymity and control 
over transactions.237 While most early efforts failed to gain popular 
appeal,238 the digital cash community persevered, as did their general 
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distaste for government regulation.239 Fast forward to 2008, when this 
libertarian spirit meets a global financial crisis and subsequent 
government bailout—the formerly niche interest suddenly has a wider 
audience when the global banking system, trusted by many, failed 
spectacularly.240 This general distrust of government intervention has 
not subsided and continues to permeate the Bitcoin community.241 
Other early Bitcoin advocates, however, recognized the need for 
limited government intervention, and that limited prosecution of the 
most egregious thefts may be welcomed.242 From a normative 
perspective, the rule of law must outweigh libertarian ambitions of 
anonymity and privacy, and practically speaking, prosecution of 
Bitcoin theft may help, not hinder, the development of the 
technology. The balance between encouraging innovation and 
maintaining order is tenuous, but both Congress and the courts 
indicate that the criminal law is an appropriate vehicle for enforcing 
that order.243 Criminal prosecutions deter bad actors—and potential 
disrupters of the project—while leaving technological development 
largely uninterrupted. And prosecution of bad actors will bolster the 
general trust and confidence in blockchain, further incentivizing its 
development and application. 
B. Law Enforcement 
The most difficult challenge may be left to law enforcement—the 
relative anonymity of the crypto-asset thief will require enforcement 
agencies to expend tremendous resources, both time and money, to 
track down the bad actor. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
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(“FBI”) was aware of the problem of anonymity and its implications 
for theft and other malicious uses of blockchain technology as far 
back as 2011.244 To complicate matters further, the blockchain 
industry continues to create features to increase the relative 
anonymity of users like “mixing services” and multi-signature 
transactions.245 And bad actors are paying attention to these 
innovations in anonymity, using them as a shield while they search for 
new weaknesses in the technology.246 Considering these challenges, 
the FBI and other agencies will have to continue to be creative in 
forging solutions to these complex new crimes.247 
Losses from cybercrime continue to rise, however, and if the 
market price of Bitcoin increases drastically or blockchain-based 
assets become critical parts of the transfer of business information, 
theft will increasingly play a role in that statistic.248 While this may 
seem, in the larger scheme of federal criminal enforcement, to be a 
minor issue at present, Bitcoin theft fits neatly into other trends of 
increasing internet-based crimes already present.249 Data breach—a 
crime with obvious similarities to Bitcoin theft—already accounts for 
the second-most number of victims in the last year of reported 
statistics.250  
And, to their credit, enforcement agencies seem to be taking first 
steps in meeting the challenge of rapidly advancing technology.251 
Private-sector groups are similarly devising ways to use public 
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addresses and information to identify bad actors.252 Chainalysis, for 
example, has already established partnerships with the FBI, SEC, and 
other agencies.253 It seems likely that social forces around Bitcoin 
theft, and possibly a correlated increasing economic effect, will be 
crucial in convincing enforcement agencies to dedicate the resources 
to overcome these challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
Bitcoin continues to grab headlines and will continue to play a 
part in the national conversation as the use cases for the technology 
expand. One can expect that the cases of theft will likely increase as 
well. Prosecution of this theft will merely recognize an interest in 
Bitcoin that society already acknowledges—Bitcoin is a thing that can 
be owned and taking it is an action that the law must punish. 
This is not simply important as possible recourse to compensate 
victims, or even to deter future thieves, although this will play a part 
in the conversation. Rather, action will further fundamental concepts 
of the American rule of law—intolerance of unjust takings that 
violate another’s rightful ownership interest. And from a practical 
perspective, enforcement will provide a necessary stop-gap while 
other government actors and agencies grapple with the proper 
approach to blockchain-based technologies and the law. A path exists 
and should be pursued. 
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